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Introduction
1.1 The KLJN secure key exchange
In today’s era, network security has become one of the most
important aspects in everyday life. Whether it is a large, small,
private, or a government organization, it is very important to focus
on security, especially when the data being sent, received, or stored
contain confidential, sensitive information, such as personal
information.
In private-key based secure communication, the two commu-
nicating parties (Alice and Bob) generate and share a secure key,
which is typically represented by a random bit sequence. It is
important to note that the security of a communication cannot be
better than the security of the exchange of the key it uses. During
this key exchange, the eavesdropper (often referred to as Eve) is
continuously monitoring the related data. In today’s Internet-
based secure communications, typically a software–based key
generation and distribution is utilized. However, in this method
the whole information about the secure key is publicly available
[1] and Eve’s access to this information is limited only by her
computational power. In other words, this method provides only a
(computationally) conditional security level, which represents a non-
future-proof-security [2–4]. It means that with a sufficiently
enhanced computation power or an efficient future algorithm, Eve
may be able to crack the key and all the information in the
communication may become accessible.
Therefore, scientists and researchers have been working on
exploring proper laws of physics to find new key exchange schemes
where the information that can be measured by Eve is zero.
Particularly, they have been exploring key exchange schemes
where the amount of information extracted by Eve does not
depend on her computational power. When the security measures
are determined at Eve’s maximal ability (limited only by the laws
of physics and the protocols working conditions), that is referred as
unconditional security, a term that is often interchanged with
information theoretic security [1]. Information theoretic (unconditional)
security can be perfect if Eve can extract no information, or imperfect,
if Eve can extract only a small, commonly accepted amount of
information. (This is allowed for practical purpose because this
small information leak can further be decreased by privacy
amplification, if the fidelity of the key exchange between Alice and
Bob is good enough.) These terms are often misunderstood, and it
is a frequent mistake in claims to misuse unconditional security and
imply perfect security by that.
It is important to emphasize that the goal to generate/distribute
a perfectly secure key is similar to approaching infinity. Perfectly
secure key distribution of a key of finite length can never be
reached with a real physical system within a finite duration of time.
However, it is one of the goals of physical informatics to find out
schemes that can arbitrarily approach (though never reach) perfect
security [2].
The earliest and most famous scheme based on the laws of
physics that is claiming unconditional security is the Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD) [5]. The information theoretic security of
this scheme is usually based on the assumption that Eve’s actions
will disturb the system (in accordance with the theory of quantum
measurements and the no-cloning theorem) and cause errors,
which uncover the eavesdropping. Note, there are some promising
non-QKD initiatives that involve new types of quantum effects
[6,7].
At the fundamental side, there are ongoing debates between
experts about the reachable levels of security in QKD [8–12]. At
the practical side, there are some issues associated with this
scheme, such as range, price, and robustness. Moreover, it is
interesting to note that recently all the commercial QKD devices
and many laboratory devices have been cracked by quantum-
hacking [13–27]. While most of these practical weaknesses seem to
be design flaws, not fundamental security problems; they still mean
that current practical QKD has yet conditional security: the
conditions are that Eve is not knowledgeable enough or she does
not have the proper hardware to utilize the design flaws for an
attack. The impressive list of papers [13–27] shows that there are
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enough knowledgeable Eves out with sufficient resources at the
moment.
Until 2005 QKD was the only accepted scheme that was able to
offer a key exchange with information theoretic security in the
ideal (mathematical) situation. In 2005, the Kirchhoff-Law-
Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution was intro-
duced [28], where the term "totally secure" was used instead of the
correct "perfectly secure" expression. Later (2006), the KLJN
system had been built and demonstrated [29]. KLJN is also a key
exchange scheme with information theoretic security [3] and it is
based on Kirchhoff’s Loop Law of quasi-static electrodynamics
and the Fluctuation and Dissipation theorem of statistical physics.
Its security against passive attacks is ultimately based on the
Second Law of Thermodynamics [28], which means that it is as
hard to crack the key exchange as to build a perpetual motion
machine (of the second kind). At practical conditions it uses
enhanced (electronically generated) Johnson noise with high noise
temperature, where quasi-static and thermodynamic aspects must
be emulated as exactly as possible in order to approach perfect
security.
First, we present a brief description (based on [2–4,28]) of the
working principle of the KLJN system. The core KLJN system,
without the defense circuitry against invasive attacks and
vulnerabilities represented by non-ideal building elements is
shown in the following figure.
The core KLJN channel, see Fig. 1, is a wire line to which Alice
and Bob connect randomly selected resistors RA and RB,
respectively, where RA,RB[ R0,R1f g. R0 represents the low (0)
bit and R1 the high (1) bit, respectively [28]. At the beginning of
each bit exchange period, BEP, (also called KLJN clock period),
Alice and Bob, who possess identical pairs of the resistors R0 and
R1, randomly select and connect one of these resistors. The
Gaussian voltage noise generators represent either the Johnson
noises of the resistors or external noise generators delivering band-
limited white noise with publicly known bandwidth and effective
noise temperature Teff [2,3,28,29]. The noise voltages of Alice and
Bob are uA(t) and uB(t), respectively, where
uA(t)[ u0,A(t),u1,A(t)f g and uB(t)[ u0,B(t),u1,B(t)f g yield a channel
noise voltage uch(t) between the wire line and the ground and a
channel noise current ich(t) in the wire.
Alice and Bob measure the mean-square noise voltage and/or
current amplitudes, that is Su2ch(t)Tand/or Si
2
ch(t)T, within the
BEP in the line. Thus, by applying Johnson’s noise formula and
Kirchhoff’s loop law the theoretical prediction is that the mean-
square noise voltage and current (i.e. the integral of the
corresponding power spectral densities [2,28]) for a given channel
noise bandwidth BKLJN and temperature Teff are given as follows:
Su2ch(t)T~Su,ch(f )BKLJN~4kTeff RjjBKLJN
Si2ch(t)T~Si,ch(f )BKLJN~4kTeff
1
Rloop
BKLJN , ð1Þ
where ST represents ideal (infinite-time) time average, Su,ch(f ) is
the power density spectrum of channel voltage noise, Si,ch(f ) is the
power density spectrum of channel current noise, k is the
Boltzmann constant, Rjj~RARB=(RAzRB) and Rloop~RAz
RB.
Ideally, by comparing the result of the accurate measurement of
the mean-square channel voltage or current with the correspond-
ing theoretical value in Eq. 1, the total loop resistance will be
publicly known. Alice and Bob know their own resistor values and
thus they can deduce that resistance value from the loop resistance
to learn the resistance at the other end. Consequently, they can
distill the actual bit value at the other side of the wire.
If Alice and Bob use the same resistance values, Eve can also
recognize that bit situation because the total resistance is either the
lowest or the highest value of the three possible resistance values.
Thus, the resistor situations (R0,R0) and (R1,R1) represent a non-
secure bit exchange since Eve can also find out the resistors values,
their exact locations, and the status of the bits. On the other hand,
the cases (R0,R1) and (R1,R0), which yield identical mean-square
noise in the line, represent a secure bit exchange situation because
Eve is unable to locate the resistors, therefore, she cannot decide if
Alice (and Bob) has a bit 1 or 0. This security is provided by the
Second Law of Thermodynamics, which prohibits any directional
information concerning the resistors at the two sides in thermal
equilibrium [2,28]. In other words, it is as difficult to extract these
secure bits by Eve as to build a perpetual motion machine (of the
second kind). In conclusion, on average, 50% of the bits can be
kept because they are secure. The other 50% of the bits
representing the non-secure situations is discarded by the protocol.
Note: the securely exchanged bits have opposite values at Alice
and Bob, thus they must publicly agree which one of them will
invert the exchanged bit to have identical keys at the two ends.
The fully armed KLJN system is secure even against the man-
in-the-middle-attack [30]. One of the important potential appli-
cations [32] is to integrate the KLJN system on computer chips
and provide unconditional security within computers and high-
security instrumentations where the processors, hard drives,
keyboards, etc. would secure their communications by keys shared
via the KLJN protocol. Another, potential application is, at a
much greater scale, to build a network of KLJN systems utilizing
already existing wire lines [4,33,34], particularly, realizing and
unconditionally secure "smart grid" [4] (advanced electrical power
distribution network).
1.2 Known attack types
Below, based on [2], we briefly survey all the published attack
types. Due to the simplicity of the KLJN system, there are very few
attack types available. The method of comparing the instanta-
Figure 1. Outline of the core KLJN secure exchange scheme [2–
4,28] without the defense elements against active (invasive)
attacks or attacks utilizing non-ideal components and condi-
tions. RA, uA(t), RB, and uB(t) are the resistor values and noise voltages
at Alice and Bob, respectively. uch(t) and ich(t) are channel noise voltage
and current, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081103.g001
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neous values of voltage and current at the two ends and discarding
risky 01/10 bits [28,30,31] (not discussed here in details) protects
against all these types of attacks. But even without discarding the
risky bits, passive attacks by Eve utilizing non-idealities suffer from
weak signal-to-noise ratio due to poor statistics, see below.
A practically unimportant but theoretically valid type of attack
was shown by Hao [36] who pointed out that the non-ideal
situation of different temperatures could separate the noise levels
of the 01 and 10 bit situations, thus they could give out some
information to Eve. In a response by Kish [37], it was pointed out
that practical problems of accuracy do not challenge the
conceptual security of ideal schemes and was estimated that, even
at practical situations, the information leak is negligible due to this
attack. Later, it was shown in the experimental paper of Mingesz
et al. [29] that a modest 14-bit accuracy of temperatures (noise
generators) practically prohibit Eve to extract any useful informa-
tion (with information leak less than 10210) by utilizing the Hao
attack.
Scheuer and Yariv [38] analyzed the case of non-zero wire
resistance where the mean-square voltages are different at the two
ends in the case of the 01 and 10 bit situations. However, their
calculation was incorrect including the physical units of some of
the main results. Kish and Scheuer [39] carried out new, correct
calculations and showed that the actual effect is about 1000 times
weaker than predicted by Scheuer and Yariv. Earlier, Kish
pointed out [37] in his response to [36] that at similar conditions
Eve’s statistic was very poor and the extracted information was
practically miniscule even without the defense of discarding the
risky bits. This claim was experimentally verified by Mingesz et al.
[29], who showed that at clock period of 50 times of the noise
correlation time, R0~2000V, R1~9000V, and wire resistance
200V, the information leak of exchanged raw bits to Eve was
0.19% while the fidelity between Alice and Bob was 99.98%.
These results indicate that the key exchange has excellent fidelity
even without error correction and that the security can be made
reasonably good even without dropping the risky 01/10 bits (after
current/voltage comparison at the two ends) and without privacy
amplification [29].
Liu [41] used a cable simulator to evaluate the impact of delays
and reflections on the security. He obtained the surprising results
that, with the experimental parameters [6], Eve successfully
guessed 70-80% of the key bits. In a critical study of Lui’s
simulations, Kish and Horvath [31] pointed out that the chosen
wave impedances of the simulated cable to reach these results were
unphysical: for example, a center wire diameter of 1 millimeter
implies a coaxial cable with outer diameter of 28000 times greater
than the size of the known universe.
Observing transients after switching the resistors has been
mentioned as a potential source of information leak; however, so
far they have never been utilized. During the experimental studies,
the noise was ramped up at the beginning of the clock period and
ramped down at the end, thus the switching of resistors took place
when the voltage and currents were zero in the line.
Note, a fully transient-free protocol is described in a recent work
[48].
According to [40], one of the most efficient attack types would
be utilizing capacitive currents via the cable capacitance, though it
has never been tested. Mingesz et al. [29] showed a hardware
based defense "capacitance killer" against this attack. Ultimately,
the method of discarding the risky bits after current/voltage
comparison at the two ends [28,30,31] and/or, in the case of
negligible error probability, privacy amplification [35] are the
tools to approach perfect security.
1.3 Bit errors in the KLJN key exchange
Due to the finite duration t of the bit exchange period BEP, the
measurement results of mean-square amplitudes have statistical
inaccuracies. The duration t of the BEP must be long-enough
compared to the correlation time of the noise (approximately the
reciprocal noise-bandwidthB{1KLJN ) to achieve a satisfactory statis-
tics and safely distinguish between the different resistor situations.
Still, with a low probability, these uncertainties can trigger a bit
error.
In the experimental demonstration Mingesz et al. [29] were able
to optimize the system to have a fidelity of 99.98% (error
probability 0.02%) however no mathematical analysis or design
tools have been shown to address this problem. Therefore, our
goal in this paper is to classify the different types of bit errors in the
ideal KLJN system and analyze their impact.
Discussion and Results
2.1 KLJN Errors
In this "startup" paper about error analysis, we assume the ideal
situation of the KLJN system where all the non-ideal features of
real systems are neglected. The error analysis of non-ideal systems
will be done in future works.
Bit errors occur when the actual value of the mean-square noise
results in an incorrect bit interpretation. Figure 2 represents the
mean-square channel noise voltage levels, where STt indicates
finite (t) time average implying random fluctuations (statistical
errors) around the real mean-square value.
The 11 bit situation (when Bob’s and Alice’s chosen resistors are
R1 and their noise voltages are u1,A(t) and u1,B(t), respectively)
results in the mean-square channel noise voltage Su211(t)Tt.
Similarly the 01/10 situations yield Su201=10(t)Tt and the 00 bit
arrangement results in Su200(t)Tt. The threshold values D1 and D2
Figure 2. Illustration of the fluctuations of the finite-time
mean-square voltage levels around their exact value and
thresholds for interpretation (the scale is arbitrary). Su211(t)Tt,
Su201=10(t)Tt , Su
2
00(t)Tt are the measured mean-square channel noise
voltages at the 11, 01/10 and 00 bit situations, respectively. The solid
lines with the quantities in ST represent ideal (infinite-time) averages.
For the sake of simplicity we assume R0~R and, R1~aR withaww1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081103.g002
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provide the boundaries to interpret the measured mean-square
channel voltage over the t time window, see Fig. 2. The bit
interpretation is 00 whenSu2ch(t)TtvSu
2
00(t)TzD1, and 11 when
Su2ch(t)TtwSu
2
11(t)T{D2. The secure bit situation 01/10is inter-
preted whenSu200(t)TzD1ƒSu
2
ch(t)TtƒSu
2
11(t)T{D2.
An example for a bit error is the rare occurrence when the
finite-time mean-square voltage of the 00 case,
Su200(t)Tt§Su
2
00(t)TzD1, is interpreted as the 01/10 bit situation,
which is incorrect and an example of a bit error.
The different types of errors are shown in Table 1.
Some of the errors situations, as shown in Table 1, are
considered to be self-corrected by the protocol. This is because, as
aforementioned, the 00 and 11 bit situations are discarded.
The rest of the paper is dealing with the analysis of errors
indicated with * in Table 1.
2.2 Error probabilities in the KLJN scheme
Alice and Bob can calculate the total resistance in the system by
measuring the mean-square noise voltage and/or current ampli-
tudes, that is, Su2ch(t)Tt and/or Si
2
ch(t)Tt. Below we evaluate the
errors in the former case while the case of current-based
evaluation can be done in a very similar fashion.
2.2.1 Error probability due to inaccuracies in noise
voltage measurements. a) Probability of the 00 = =.
01/10 type errors.
Let R0~R and R1~aR with aww1. Note, the choice of a
does not influence the resulting equations but it determines the
upper limit at choosing the values of D1 and D2 (see Eqs. 1). Then,
the mean-square channel noise voltage for infinite-time average at
the 00 bit situation is given as:
Su200(t)T~S00(f )BKLJN , (2)
where S00(f )~Su,ch(f ) at the bit situation 00. Because
Rjj~R=2, from Eqs. 1, we obtain:
Su200(t)T~2kTeff RBKLJN ð3Þ
During the BEP, only the duration t is available for Alice, Bob
and Eve to determine the mean-square channel noise because,
after that, a new bit exchange begins. The block diagram of the
measurement process is shown in Fig. 3.
The channel voltage enters into a squaring unit. At its output,
the signal is still voltage (because it is a voltage-signal-based
electronics) and the numerical value of its instantaneous amplitude
is equal to the square of the instantaneous amplitude of the input
voltage. This fact is mathematically expressed by Du200(t), where
D~
1
Volt
is the transfer coefficient of the device to provide a Volt
unit also for the square [42]. After averaging for the finite-time t
duration, the obtained measurement result is
SDu200(t)Tt~SDu
2
00(t)Tzut(t), where the averaging can be
represented by a low-pass filtering with cut-off frequency fB&1=t.
While u200(t) is not Gaussian, its finite-time average ut(t) is
Gaussian with high accuracy due to the Central Limit Theorem,
because t is much longer than the correlation time of the AC
component u2,00(t)~Du
2
00(t){SDu
2
00(t)T of Du
2
00(t), as
fBvvBKLJN . The probability of 00 = =. 01/10 type errors is
the probability that the AC component remaining after the finite-
time average of Du200(t) defined as ut(t)~SDu
2
00(t)Tt{SDu
2
00(t)T
is beyond the threshold: ut(t)wD1. This can be evaluated by the
error function, however, requires numerical integration.
To have an analytic formula, which is a good approximation
and has the exact scaling in the small error probability limit, that
is, when ut(t)vvD1 is satisfied, we can use Rice’s formula [43,44]
of threshold crossing frequency, see similar solutions for estimating
Table 1. Types of errors in the KLJN bit exchange.
Actual Situation
00 11 01/10
Measurement Interpretation
(Decision)
00 Correct (no error) Error, removed (automatically) Error, removed (automatically)
11 Error, removed (automatically) Correct (no error) Error, removed (automatically)
1/10 Error* (probability?) Error* (probability?) Correct (no error)
*The rest of the paper addresses these errors and their probability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081103.t001
Figure 3. Illustration of the measurement process at 00. D is
calibration coefficient of the squaring device to provide a Volt unit with
the correct numerical value for the squaring operation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081103.g003
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the probability of thermal noise induced switching errors [45–47].
The estimation of error probability is based on the fact that, in the
small error limit, the probability of repeated threshold crossings
within the correlation time of the band-limited noise converges to
zero. The correlation time of ut(t) is also equal to t thus each
threshold crossing (in a chosen but fixed direction) indicates an
independent error. The ratio of the mean threshold crossing
frequency n(D1) and t is a good estimation of the error probability
in this limit [45,46]. We compared the predictions of the Rice
formula with the prediction based on numerically evaluated error
function and found that the Rice formula gave always more
pessimistic error estimation. The variation of the threshold
resulted in changing the error probability prediction by the Rice
formula and the error function by factors of ,1043 and ,1044,
respectively. In the large error probability situation, the Rice
formula predicted about 2 times greater error while, in the low
error probability situation, about 18 times greater error. This is a
negligible difference not only due to the 1043 – 1044 variation
during the study but also because the exact error probability
slightly depends on the fine details of the protocol not discussed
here. To have analytic error estimation, we proceed as follows.
According to Rice, the mean frequency n of crossing the level D1
by a Gaussian with power density spectrum St(f ) is given as:
n(D1)~
2
u^t
exp
{D21
2u^2t
 ! ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffið?
0
f 2St(f )df
s
ð4Þ
where St(f ) is the power density spectrum of ut(t) and u^t is its
RMS value, u^t~~
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffið?
0
St(f )df
s
.
For normalization purposes, we choose the D1 threshold level as
a fraction of the measured mean-square channel noise, where the
transfer coefficient D of the squaring unit is also taken into the
account:
D1~bSDu200(t)T~bDS00(f )BKLJN , where 0vbv1: ð5Þ
According to [42], the power density spectrum, S2,00(f ), of the
AC component u2,00(t) of the (non-averaged) u
2
00(t) is given as
(note typos of missing factor of 2 in Eqs. 6 and 7 in [42], see Fig. 4):
S2,00(f )~2D
2BKLJNS
2
00(f )(1{
f
2BKLJN
) for 0ƒfƒ2BKLJN
and S2,00(f)~0 otherwise
ð6Þ
The low-pass filtering effect of the time averaging cuts off this
spectrum for fwfB but keeps the S2,00(f ) spectrum for fvfB.
Because fBvvBKLJN , the value of S2,00(f ) within the fB
frequency band can be approximated by its maximum,
St(f )&S2,00(0). Figure 5 summarizes these findings.
Let us suppose that BKLJN=fB~c. Then
u^t~
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffið?
0
St(f )df
s
&
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
fBS2,00(0)
p
~
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2D2cf 2BS
2
00(f )
q
ð7Þ
see text above and Figure 3 for explanation of the approxima-
tion. The frequency n:(D1) of unidirectional level crossings is half
of the level crossing frequency predicted by the Rice formula:
Figure 4. Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the product of two
independent noises. S2,00(f ) is the power density spectrum of the AC
component u2,00(t) of the (non-averaged) u
2
00(t).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081103.g004
Figure 5. Spectra at the 00 bit situation. The low-pass filtering
effect of the time averaging cuts off this spectrum for fwfB but keeps
the S2,00(f ) spectrum for fvfB . Since fvvBKLJN , the value of S2,00(f )
within the frequency band fB can be approximated by its maximum, so
that St(f )&S2,00(0)~2D2BKLJNS200(f ).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081103.g005
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n:(D1)~
1
u^t
exp
{D21
2u^2t
 ! ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffið?
0
f 2St(f )df
s
, ð8Þ
where
D1~bDS00(f )cfB ð9Þ
From Eqs. 7 and 9, we obtain
n:(D1)~
fBffiffiffi
3
p exp {b
2D2S200(f )c
2f 2B
4D2cf 2BS
2
00(f )
 !
~
fBffiffiffi
3
p exp {b
2c
4
 !
ð10Þ
In the high threshold situation the errors follow a Poisson
statistics, thus the error probability during a time interval is equal
to the expected numbers of errors within this interval provided this
number is much less than 1.
Thus the probability e00 of 00= =.01/10 type of errors in the
case of e00vv1 is:
e00&n:(D1)t&
n:(D1)
fB
~
1ffiffiffi
3
p exp {b
2c
4
 !
ð11Þ
It is important to realize that the error probability is an
exponential function of the parameters. The cparameter (which is
proportional to the length of time average) is particularly
important because it is not limited in size.
b) Probability of the 11 = =. 01/10 type errors
We can follow the same procedure as above. Instead of b we
introduce d with similar meaning, see Fig. 2 and Eq. 5:
D2~dSDu211(t)T~dDS11(f )BKLJN~dcDS11(f )fB 0vdv1, ð12Þ
where D2 is the threshold for the 11= =.01/10 type errors
and S11(f ) is the channel noise spectrum at the 11 bit situation.
The same type of calculations as given above yields the
probability e11 of 11= =.01/10 type errors:
e11~
n(D2)
fB
~
1ffiffiffi
3
p exp {d
2c
4
 !
for 0vdv1 ð13Þ
The error probability is again an exponential function of the
parameters.
2.3 Illustration of the results with practical parameters
To demonstrate the results, we assign possible practical values to
the parameters.
For c~100 and b~0:5 (a choice allowed due to the aww1
condition, see Eqs. 1) the bit error probability e00 is:
e00~
1ffiffiffi
3
p exp {b
2c
4
 !
&0:001, ð14Þ
which is a value near to the experimental value (0.0002)
obtained in [29] with the same c~100 value (note the b value is
not available in [29] however the b~0:5 choice is a practical one).
If this value is too large, just by increasing the c parameter (and
the time average window t) by a factor of 2, and in this way
slowing down the bit exchange by the same factor, will result in the
square of the above error probability value:
e00&10{6, ð15Þ
which is satisfactory for most applications. It is important to
note that no error correction algorithm is used for this error
reduction.
Methods and Conclusions
We have classified and analyzed the types of errors of bit
exchange between Alice and Bob in the KLJN secure key
exchange. Some types of errors are automatically removed by the
original protocol. We mathematically analyzed the error proba-
bilities and their dependence on the KLJN parameters of the
errors that are not removed by the protocol. We identified the
important parameters and the results show that the error
probability decays exponentially by increasing these parameters.
The most important of such parameters is the duration t of key
exchange because its value is not limited. The results indicate that
it is reasonable to achieve error probabilities that are small enough
to avoid the need for error correction algorithms.
Further open questions are how to combine current and voltage
measurements to further reduce these errors and what is the error
situation in the new advanced KLJN protocols proposed recently
[48].
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